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GLOBAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE-
FROM STOCKHOLM TO COPENHAGEN
ANITA M. HALVORSSENt
INTRODUCTION
The anthropogenic effect on the climate system demands that strong
action be taken now to avoid the worst impacts.' The tipping point be-
fore the onset of catastrophe is no longer decades away.2 This is a global
problem that calls for international cooperation on a scale comparable to
the Marshall Plan after World War II to "reshape the world's future
economy and redirect investment flows into a sustainable future" as Yvo
de Boer, the Executive Director of the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has stated the case.3 The inter-
national community has produced the legal tools for dealing with the
problem in the form of the UNFCCC 4 and the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC (Kyoto Protocol),5 yet these need to be amended to take into
t Adjunct Professor, University of Denver, College of Law; Lecturer, University of Colo-
rado, Political Science Department; Director, Global Legal Solutions, LLC (e-mail: am-
halvorss@aol.com). This article is based on a presentation given at the Denver University Law
Review Symposium, Climate Change: Integrating Environmental Justice into Policy, Regulation,
and Litigation, February 15, 2008.
1. NICHOLAS STERN, Summary of Conclusions, in STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE vi (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/
SummaryofConclusions.pdf [hereinafter STERN REVIEW: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS].
2. See Jeremy Lovell, Interview-The World Has Under Decade to Act on Climate Crisis,
REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.planetark.com/
dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/39096/story.htm; see also Juliet Eilperin, Debate on Climate Shifts to
Issue of Irreparable Change, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2006/01/28/AR2006012801021 .html; Ian
Sample, Warming Hits Tipping Point, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/climate change/story/0,12374,1546824,00.html.
3. Press Release, UNFCCC Secretariat, Latin American and Caribbean Countries to Play
Key Role in Global Fight Against Climate Change (Feb. 1, 2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/press/releases/application/pdf/20080201 santo domingo release eng.pdf; see
also UN News Service, Joint Attack on Climate Change and Poverty Needed, Al Gore Tells Audi-
ence at UN (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=
23942&Cr=climate&Crl =change#.
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849
(1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC has near universal participation with 192 Parties as of
August 22, 2007. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Status of Ratifi-
cation, http://unfccc.int/essential-background/convention/status-of ratification/items/2631.php (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008).
5. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (2007) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. As of January 15, 2008, there were 178
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol; see also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change: Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/
files/kyotoprotocol/background/status of ratification/application/pdf/kpratification.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Status of Kyoto Protocol].
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account the current status of the climate science and the international
political situation.6
At the thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-
13) in Bali in 2007, the international community recognized the serious-
ness of the climate change situation as stipulated in the Intergovermmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) latest report by referring directly
to the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report in the Bali Action Plan, which
stated that "warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and that delay
in reducing emissions significantly constrains opportunities to achieve
lower stabilization levels and increases the risk of more severe climate
change impacts."7 Now there is no longer any excuse for not taking ur-
8gent action. The international community must be able to "deliver as
one" if we are to have any chance in humanity's "war" against global
climate change. However, as is usual in international law, multilateral
cooperation takes time. All that was agreed to in Bali was an agenda, not
a substantive agreement on the amounts of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions that need to be reduced nor which particular states are to take these
actions. 9 Reaching "an agreed outcome" and adopting a decision nearly
two years from now, in Copenhagen in 2009, does not exemplify a leap
to action considering the seriousness of the climate change problem.
Yet, this was considered a success, mainly due to all the disagreements
that have plagued the last few meetings.' 0
Among the many problems that need to be resolved, two deal with
important equity issues that have plagued the climate change negotia-
tions for a number of years. One problem is that the United States is not
willing to commit to mandatory cuts in GHGs, and hence has not ratified
the Kyoto Protocol. The other problem, closely related to the first, is that
the emerging economies, the fast-growing developing countries such as
India and China, do not have any mandatory cuts in the Kyoto Protocol,
6. This article is, in part, based on an earlier article amending only the Kyoto Protocol. See
Anita M. Halvorssen, Common, but Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate Change
Regime-Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund, 18
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247 (2007).
7. The text in Decision -/CP.13 is "[r]esponding to the findings of the Fourth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ...." See United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Bali Action Plan, Decision -/CP.13, at I (Dec. 15, 2007), available
at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp bali-action.pdf (last visited Mar. 28,
2008) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan]; see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate
Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers (2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr-spm.pdf [hereinafter IPCC's AR4].
8. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, at 1 ("Recognizing... and emphasizing the urgency
to address climate change as indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report .... ).
9. See generally Robert N. Stavins & Joseph Aldy, Harvard Project on International Climate
Agreements, Bali Climate Change Conference: Key Takeaways (Dec. 18, 2007), available at
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17781/bali-climate-changeconference.html (giving
an overview of the Bali Climate Change Conference).
10. See Thomas Fuller & Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Plan Looks Beyond Bush's Tenure,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/world/16climate.html.
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even if they are Parties to the Protocol. These major economies will
soon overtake the industrialized countries in amounts of GHG emissions.
In order to solve these two problems, this article posits amending
the UNFCCC to include a new category of Parties-Annex III Parties-
defined as emerging economies (the fast-growing developing countries).
These countries will be able to commit to mitigation measures/emission
cuts under a new Annex C of the Kyoto Protocol in return for financial
and technological assistance provided by a new Annex C Mitigation
Fund. Then, perhaps, the United States will feel compelled to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol and comply with its stipulated reduction targets under
Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, allowing for a unified approach against
global climate change. In order to make the Annex C Mitigation Fund
more effective, this article also suggests that the Fund include a set of
capacity-building teams, the Climate Change Corps (3Cs), as a special
corps of volunteer engineers and climate scientists among others that
would be set up by individual Annex I nations coordinated by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to make sure these
capacity-building teams are sent to the fast-growing developing countries
that need them most urgently.
Part I of this article will give an overview of the status of the cli-
mate science and its impacts based on the IPCC's Fourth Assessment
Report, since this has a bearing on the equity issues. The relationship
between climate change and sustainable development, examined in Part
II, will specifically address the equity principle of common, but differen-
tiated responsibilities. Part III will analyze the roadmap and outcome of
the international climate change negotiations at the Bali Conference. In
Part IV, this article will examine the extent to which the amendments
suggested to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol address the main bar-
riers to having an all inclusive agreement to address the scourge of cli-
mate change.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPACTS
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report is a collaborative effort by
hundreds of scientists from around the world assessing the current scien-
tific knowledge about climate change." In this Part, I will briefly pre-
sent the IPCC and the findings of its reports, with the main focus being
on the impacts, showing how they will affect developing countries dis-
proportionately.
The IPCC was established in 1988 as an intergovernmental body by
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme.12 Its primary function is to provide decision-
11. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About IPCC,
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
12. Id.
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
makers with an objective source of information about climate change by
assessing "on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the
latest scientific, technical and socio-economic literature produced
worldwide relevant to the understanding of the risk of human-induced
climate change, its observed and projected impacts and options for adap-
tation and mitigation."' 3
The IPCC has three main groups which each produce a report:
Working Group I, which produces the report on the Physical Science
Basis of Climate Change; Working Group II, which focuses on Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability; and Working Group III, which focuses on
Mitigation.14 In addition, the IPCC produces the Synthesis Report and
other Special Reports. a5 Final reports are accepted at a Plenary Session
of the IPCC and the Summaries for Policymakers are approved line by
line. 16 The last steps in the procedure include a consensus by the interna-
tional community.'
7
Working Group I of the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report, which
addresses the scientific basis of climate change, emphasized that "warm-
ing of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observa-
tions of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, wide-
spread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level."' 8
The report states that "global increases in carbon dioxide concentration
are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land use change, while those of
methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture."' 9 The report
also states that the "atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide in 2005
exceeds by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years., 20  With
greater scientific understanding since the Third Assessment Report, there
is now "very high confidence that the global average net effect of human
13. Id.
14. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, How the IPCC Is Organ-
ized, http://www.ipcc.ch/about/how-the-ipcc-is-organized.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); see also
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, The IPCC Working Group I,
http://www.ipcc.ch /about/working-groupl.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, About the IPCC, The IPCC Working Group II,
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/working-group2.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, About the IPCC, The IPCC Working Group III,
http://www.ipcc.ch/about/working-group3.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
15. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Reports,
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/index.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
16. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Sixteen Years of Scientific Assessment in
Support of the UNFCCC 4, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/l0th-anniversary/anniversary-
brochure.pdf.
17. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Principles Governing IPCC Work 2, avail-
able at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-principles.pdf"
18. WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5, available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf [hereinafter WORKING GROUP I
REPORT].
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
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activities since 1750 has been one of warming ....,,2 1 The report notes
that "numerous long-term changes in climate," such as "changes in arctic
temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts,
ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather including
droughts" have been observed.22 The IPCC also states that the observed
increases in average global temperatures since the 1950s are "very
likely" due to the observed increase in human-induced GHG concentra-
tions.23
Working Group II's report on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability
states that "[o]bservational evidence from all continents and most oceans
shows that many natural systems are being affected by regional climate
changes, particularly temperature increases., 24  Examples include in-
creased numbers of glacial lakes, ground instability in permafrost, and
changes in some Artic and Antarctic ecosystems.25  The extent of
drought-affected areas is likely to increase.26 At lower latitudes, crop
productivity is projected to decrease, leading to risk of hunger.27 In Af-
rica, 75-250 million people are expected to be exposed to an increase of
water stress due to climate change by 2020.28 The report also states that
new studies confirm that Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents
to climate variability and change, due to its many stresses and low ability
to adapt.29 The report further details that climate change will hamper
sustainable development for most developing countries in Asia as it in-
creases the pressures on natural resources and the environment in con-
junction with rapid urbanization, industrialization, and economic devel-
opment.30
Working Group II of the IPCC also addresses adaptation and vul-
nerability to climate change. In that context, the report explains that the
future vulnerability to climate impacts is not only due to projected cli-
mate change, but also projected social and economic changes. 31 Other
stresses exacerbate the vulnerability to climate change, such as poverty,
unequal access to resources, food insecurity and incidence of disease
(HIV/AIDS). 32  The projected number of people affected by climate
change is greater in areas with low per capita income and large popula-
21. Id. at 3. "Very high confidence" means "at least a 9 out of 10 chance of being correct."
See id. n.7.
22. Id at 7.
23. See id. at 8. "Very likely" means more than 90 percent likely. See id. at 3, n.6.
24. WORKING GROUP 11, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 1PCC FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 8, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf [hereinafter WORKING GROUP 11 REPORT].
25. Id.
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id.
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tion growth, indicating that these areas are more vulnerable.33 By in-
creasing resilience and adaptive capacity, sustainable development can
reduce vulnerability to climate change. 34 On the other hand, Working
Group II states that climate change can delay the pace of progress toward
sustainable development, either directly, through an increase in exposure
to adverse impacts, or indirectly, due to erosion of the capacity to
adapt.35
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
A. Sustainable Development
Sustainable development is most commonly defined according to
the Brundtland Commission's Report as "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the needs of future genera-
tions. 36 The need for balancing environmental and economic policies
was first addressed in an international setting at the U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972. 37 Since then the
international community has met at the U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, held in Rio de Janiero in 1992, the Millenium Summit
in New York City in 2000, and the World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment, held in Johannesburg in 2002, to further highlight the impor-
tance of these issues and to take action.38 Sustainable development is
said to encompass three pillars: environmental, economic, and social
aspects of development. 39  Climate change is a matter affecting these
very same issues. In order to tackle climate change, the goal of sustain-
able development must be attained at a much faster pace, since economic
growth produces the funding to mitigate and adapt to climate change. If
this is not done, the impacts of climate change will destroy most of the
progress made toward sustainable development. In the same way, eco-
nomic growth that is not de-coupled from fossil fuel as an energy source
will only lead to more GHG emissions. Just as was done in the case of
the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, where developing coun-
tries were not ratifying the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer until they were offered a delayed compliance schedule
33. Id. at 20.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
8 (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
37. Philippe Roch & Franz Xaver Perrez, International Environmental Governance: The
Strive Towards a Comprehensive, Coherent, Effective and Efficient International Environmental
Regime, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (2005).
38. Id. at 9; Paolo Galizzi, From Stockholm to New York, Via Rio and Johannesburg: Has the
Environment Lost Its Way on the Global Agenda?, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 952, 980, 988 (2006).
39. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Aft., Aug. 26-Sept. 4,
2002, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 1, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 199/20,
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/aconfl99d20&c _en.pdf
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and a specific funding mechanism, 40 we need to find solutions to the is-
sue of climate change by crafting equitable bargains regarding economic
and environmental issues between developed and developing countries.
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol the fast-growing developing countries
are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, but they do not have any binding re-
duction commitments.
B. Equity--Common, but Differentiated Responsibilities
Addressing global environmental problems, in general, using trea-
ties that require universal participation requires developed and develop-
ing countries to take on obligations. Under international law, countries
have accepted the principle of sovereignty to include sovereign equality
as reflected in the U.N. Charter, thereby giving all countries equal rights
and obligations on the international plane.41 Yet, to encourage universal
participation and reflect the principle of equity in international law, these
environmental treaties must provide differentiated responsibilities for
developing countries. This is because developing countries historically
have not had the same economic growth and social benefits as developed
countries, and they have contributed to a lesser degree to the environ-
mental problems. 42 This historical context, along with the developing
countries' lack of capacity to address the environmental problems, has
led to the idea of asymmetrical or differential rights and obligations for
developing countries in international environmental law.43
The problem of the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer was
the first environmental problem regarding the atmosphere that was tack-
led on a global scale using differential treatment for developing coun-
tries. 44 In many ways, it was an easier problem to solve than climate
change, since there were just a few manufacturers of ozone-depleting
substances, as opposed to all consumers of fossil fuels, from utilities to
school buses, being emitters of CO2. Once they manufactured a substi-
tute for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), an ozone depleting substance, the
manufacturers were willing to produce it. Most of the countries that
were big producers and consumers of CFCs ratified the Vienna Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, followed by the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.45 In the Montreal
Protocol, the negotiating countries adopted an approach whereby all
40. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
41. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. I ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all of its Members.").
42. ANITA MARGRETHE HALVORSSEN, EQUALITY AMONG UNEQUALS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 28-31 (1999).
43. ld. at 31.
44. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, avail-
able at http://www.oas.org/DIL/ViennaConvention-on-theLaw-ofTreaties.pdf [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]; Montreal Protocol, supra note 40.
45. See Vienna Convention, supra note 44; Montreal Protocol, supra note 40.
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countries were to take action, but developing countries were to have a
delayed compliance schedule.46 Shortly thereafter, the Montreal Protocol
was amended to include a multilateral fund to facilitate the replacement
of technology using CFCs in developing countries, thereby persuading
India and China to become Parties to the Protocol.47
Historically, developing countries have had different developmen-
tal, social, and environmental needs and priorities and have not had the
same economic benefits as the developed countries that have degraded
the global environment in their process of industrialization. However,
the picture in China and India is changing rapidly, since those countries
are growing exponentially and experiencing immense environmental
problems that need to be dealt with.48 Yet, they are much more aware of
environmental degradation than were the developed countries when they
began industrializing, and to a certain extent, they are addressing their
environmental problems using new, "cleaner" technology.49 However,
this is at a much too slow pace, mostly due to a lack of funding.
Even in this context, it is not equitable to demand that these devel-
oping countries have an equal share of the burdens of controlling GHG
emissions when, until recently, they have not done most of the pollut-
ing.50 This is because economic growth is still the primary strategy for
eradicating poverty and should not be prohibitively restricted through the
use of environmental controls. 5' Due to this principle of equity, asym-
metrical or differentiated obligations for developed and developing coun-
tries have become the norm in international environmental treaties.52
This equity principle is now often called "common, but differentiated
responsibility" (CBDR) and is expressed in Rio Declaration Principle 7:
46. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 40, at art. 5.
47. U.N. Env't Programme, Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (June 29,
1990), available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/2mlonfin.shtml.
48. See China Admits to Climate Failings, BBC NEWS, Jan. 27, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6306881 .stm.
49. See NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, CHINA'S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 31-32 (2007), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/ChinaNationalClimateChangeProgramme%20June%2007.p
df.
50. Once CO 2 is emitted to the atmosphere, it remains there for at least a century. Hence, we
are now seeing the effects of GHGs emitted since the industrial revolution. This constitutes, for the
most part, pollution from developed countries, not developing countries. University Corporation for
Atmospheric Research, Understanding Climate Change, Global Warming, Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, The Greenhouse Effect, http://www.ucar.edu/news/features/climatechange/faqs.jsp (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2008).
51. See OUR COMMON FUTUJRE, supra note 36, at 50-51; see also U.N. Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, princ. 11, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration].
52. See Yoshiru Matsui, Aspects of the Principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibili-
ties," in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND ECONOMICS 151,
166 (2002).
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States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.
In view of the different contributions to global environmental degra-
dation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in
the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the
technologies and financial resources they command.
53
Despite the fact that the CBDR principle is not considered binding
international law, it has become a cornerstone of burden-sharing struc-
tures adopted in international environmental treaties. 4 In the context of
climate change, developed countries have historically contributed the
most to the climate change problem and have the greater technological
and economic capacity to address the problem, 55 whereas developing
countries have not significantly contributed to climate change and are
more vulnerable to its impacts because they lack the resources to address
the problem. As a result, developed countries should take more respon-
sibility for controlling GHG emissions.
The CBDR principle can also be seen as requiring obligations of
solidarity assistance in the form of technology transfer and financial as-
sistance.56 To do this, developing countries would make the implementa-
tion of their commitments in environmental treaties conditional on the
receipt of assistance from developed countries.57 The UNFCCC already
reflects this theory: "the extent to which developing country Parties will
effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will de-
pend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of
their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources
and transfer of technology. ' 8
The CBDR principle does have its limits, however. First, it is only
meant to last for a limited time period to allow the developing countries
to achieve the same level of economic growth as industrialized countries,
while simultaneously addressing environmental issues.59 It is not sup-
posed to institute a permanent arrangement. Once the differences be-
tween the countries cease to exist, differential treatment should no longer
be used.60 Second, the CBDR principle should not be incompatible with
53. Rio Declaration, supra note 51, at princ. 7.
54. Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276, 299-300 (2004); see also LAVANYA RAJAMANI, DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONENTAL LAW 127, 158 (2006).
55. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 101
(2d ed. 2002).
56. Id. at 102.
57. Id.
58. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(7). This commitment is reaffirmed in Articles 10 and 11 of
the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 10(b)-(e), 11.
59. HALVORSSEN, supra note 42, at 4, 29.
60. RAJAMANI, supra note 54, at 162.
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the object and purpose of the treaty in question.6' If implementation of
the CBDR principle defeats the object and purpose of the treaty, it has
gone beyond the limits of the treaty. 62 For example, the object and pur-
pose of the UNFCCC is "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system., 63  This objective would be de-
feated if the developing countries' emissions of GHGs continue to grow
to meet their development needs, leading to dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Thus, sustainable development
requires that economic growth in all countries is balanced with the cli-
mate change objectives.
C. Equity and Climate Change-The United States and the Fast-
Growing Developing Countries
In regards to climate change, the first equity problem is that the
United States has not agreed to mandatory emission cuts and hence has
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The stage was already set with a unani-
mous vote in the U.S. Senate in 1997, in which the Senate stated that it
would not give its "advice and consent" to the Kyoto Protocol unless it
included commitments to limit GHGs for developing countries and that
the Protocol did not result in serious harm to the U.S. economy. 64 The
Senate was concerned that the U.S. would be less competitive than major
economies such as India and China if it ratified the Kyoto Protocol be-
cause these countries do not have any binding reduction commitments
under the Protocol.65
In November 2008, the United States is electing a new President.
No matter who she or he is, the future President will likely take climate
change more seriously than President Bush. The three top contenders for
the presidential race all call for mandatory cuts in carbon dioxide emis-
sions, support a market-based approach that would set caps on carbon
and other greenhouse gas emissions, and provide industries with tradable
credits.66 It would be convenient if the problem regarding the U.S. could
be solved as easily as was the case of Australia, where a new government
came into power in December 2007 and as his first official act, Prime
61. HALVORSSEN, supra note 42, at 29.
62. RAJAMANI, supra note 54, at 162.
63. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
64. See Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding the Conditions for the United States
Becoming a Signatory to Any International Agreement on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (Byrd-
Hagel Resolution).
65. See id.
66. American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science and Technology in the
2008 Presidential Election: Candidate Science & Technology Positions,
http://election2008.aaas.org/comparisons/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) (click on each candidate's
name; scroll down to the "Energy and Environment" section on web page).
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Minister Rudd took the steps needed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.67
However, the new President will still need the "advice and consent of the
Senate" before the instrument of ratification for the Kyoto Protocol can
be signed.
The United States is the only Annex I Party (industrialized country)
not to have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, though it has ratified the
UNFCCC.6 8  There are only 17 other states that are not Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol, which currently has 177 Parties.69 On April 23, 2008,
only 16 Parties will not have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, as Iraq ratified
it in January.70 It seems rather unfortunate that the international commu-
nity is supposed to draft a new agreement because the one remaining
Annex I Party does not want to cooperate with most all of the interna-
tional community which has agreed to, and worked diligently to opera-
tionalize, the Kyoto Protocol. That is not to say the Kyoto Protocol is
perfect; it needs major improvements. Yet to set it aside is perhaps a bad
idea at this urgent stage of climate change. Amending it seems a more
viable option, taking into account all the structures, procedures and enti-
ties already set up in accordance with the Protocol. Amending the
UNFCCC to add Annex III, thus arranging for fast-growing developing
countries to have binding commitments under a new Annex C of the
Kyoto Protocol, would save an enormous amount of time. The Kyoto
Protocol is already structured in such a way that the industrialized coun-
tries, Annex I Parties, are to be subjected to more stringent commitments
under Annex B of the Protocol for the subsequent commitment periods
using its own amendment procedure.7' Clearly a five percent average
decrease in GHGs emissions stipulated for the first commitment period
of the Protocol would not be enough to tackle climate change.72
The second problem, a related equity issue, concerns the fact that
the fast-growing developing countries, such as China, India, and Brazil,
do not have mandatory reduction commitments under the Kyoto Proto-
col. They are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, but the Protocol only stipu-
lates emission targets for Annex I Parties (industrialized states). How
can one require developing countries that historically have not contrib-
67. Getting Serious in Bali: Talks on Tackling Climate Change Begin, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3,
2007, available at http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfin?storyid =
10237931.
68. See Status of Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, at 7. The Principality of Andorra and San
Marino are considered to be developed States, but they are not listed as Annex I Parties in the
UNFCCC. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, annex 1 (listing all developed countries but not including
Andorra or San Marino).
69. UNFCC, Fact Sheet: The Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/files/press/back
grounders/application/pdf/fact sheetthe kyoto_protocol.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
70. See Iraq Ratifies Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, Jan. 26, 2008,
available at http://www.metimes.com/Politics/2008/0 l/26/iraq_ratifieskyoto protocol-on-climate_
change/afp/.
71. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(9).
72. See id. art. 3(1).
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 85:4
uted to global warming and are the most vulnerable to climate change, in
addition to having the least capability or financial resources to deal with
it, to also cut emissions on par with developed countries? This question
becomes even more poignant when taking into account that the U.S. does
not have any mandatory cuts because it did not ratify the Protocol.
D. Post 2012
The critical issue now is deciding which countries should take the
main responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next
phase, after 2012, when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Proto-
col comes to an end.73 Is it sufficient to carry on with the existing Kyoto
Protocol arrangement in which the current Annex I Parties 74 are to have
more stringent commitments under Article 3 to be spelled out in Annex
B75 of the Kyoto Protocol? Or should the fast-growing, developing
countries such as India and China -which emit more GHGs than several
developed countries-also take on binding commitments for the second
commitment period or soon thereafter? With the steadily growing emis-
sion of GHGs in India and China, it is clear that the international com-
munity cannot accept business as usual from any state.76 All states have
to pull their weight in the climate change context. But what does this
mean for India and China?
73. Id.
74. Annex I Parties constitute the developed countries, namely, most of the member countries
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the countries with
economies in transition (EIT). The Annex I Parties are listed at the end of the UNFCCC and include
the following countries: Australia; Austria; Belarus; Belgium; Bulgaria; Canada; Croatia; Czech
Republic; Denmark; European Economic Community; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece;
Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Monaco;
Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; Slovakia;
Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; Ukraine; United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland; and the United States of America. UNFCCC, supra note 4, annex I; see also
Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1-11, 1997, Amendments to the
List in Annex I to the Convention Under Article 4.2() of the Convention, Dec. 4/C.P.3, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1 (Mar. 18, 1998), available at
http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdfgkyoto_protocol.pdf (deleting Czechoslovakia from list and
adding Croatia, Czech Republic, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Slovakia, and Slovenia).
75. Annex B Parties are Annex I Parties that have binding limitation or reduction commit-
ments in the Kyoto Protocol. This list appears at the end of the Kyoto Protocol (the numeral is the
qualified emission limitation or reduction commitment, a percentage of the base year or period for
the first commitment period): Australia 108; Austria 92; Belgium 92; Bulgaria 92; Canada 94;
Croatia 95; Czech Republic 92; Denmark 92; Estonia 92; European Community 92; Finland 92;
France 92; Germany 92; Greece 92; Hungary 94; Iceland 110; Ireland 92; Italy 92; Japan 94; Latvia
92; Liechtenstein 92; Lithuania 92; Luxembourg 92; Monaco 92; Netherlands 92; New Zealand 100;
Norway 101; Poland 94; Portugal 92; Romania 92; Russian Federation 100; Slovakia 92; Slovenia
92; Spain 92; Sweden 92; Switzerland 92; Ukraine 100; United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland 92; and the United States of America 93. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, annex B.
The Annex I and Annex B lists of countries are essentially the same. Compare UNFCCC, supra
note 4, annex I, with Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, annex B.
76. Neil Sands, China, India Speed Climate Change. Australian Report, YAHOO! NEWS, Feb.
21, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/2008022 1/sc afp/australiaclimatewarmingreport.
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The UNFCCC dictates in Article 3 that the CBDR principle is to be
used for guidance.77 By applying the CBDR principle, the Convention
specifically stipulates in Article 4 that the developed countries are to
"take the lead."78 However, the UNFCCC does not give Annex I Parties
(developed countries) any binding commitments; it only "urges" them to
reduce their GHGs.79 Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries), how-
ever, were not given such an "aim" to reduce GHGs, but the Convention
does specify that non-Annex I Parties can take on voluntary commit-
ments to do so. 80 However, all Parties were required to fulfill binding
commitments to report on their national inventory of anthropogenic
emissions and measures taken to implement the UNFCCC. The timeta-
bles for the reporting requirements were differentiated among the Parties:
Developed countries were given a six-month deadline, developing coun-
tries were given three years, and the least-developed countries could re-
port at their discretion.8'
At the first Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention,
COP-1, in 1995, the Parties agreed in the Berlin Mandate that the com-
mitments to reduce GHGs under the UNFCCC needed to be strength-
ened, but stipulated, again, that the Annex I Parties were to "take the
lead.",82 As a result, the developing countries were not given any binding
commitments to reduce GHG emissions in what became known as the
Kyoto Protocol.
The core commitment of the Kyoto Protocol, stated in Article 3,
also clearly captures the CBDR principle. That commitment requires
Annex I Parties to reduce their overall emissions of GHGs by at least
five percent below the 1990 levels in accordance with the reduction
commitments specified in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 3 Only Annex
I Parties were given binding reduction commitments while non-Annex I
Parties were not given any targets. This has been a point of contention
for the U.S. ever since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted.
III. OUTCOME OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE IN BALI IN 2007
A. Bali Action Plan
In response to the lack of binding commitments for developing
countries, the international community finally, in 2005, at COP-11,
agreed to start a series of "dialogues" to consider long-term cooperation
under the UNFCCC "without prejudice to any future negotiations, com-
77. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 3(1).
78. Id. art. 4(2)(a).
79. Id. art. 4(2)(a)-(b).
80. Id. art. 4(2)(g).
81. Id. art. 12(5).
82. UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its First Session, § l(1)(a), U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add. I (Apr. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].
83. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(1), annex B.
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mitments, process, framework or mandate under the Convention. '8 4 At
Bali in 2008, at COP-13, the Parties to the UNFCCC established the Ad
Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWGLCA) as a
subsidiary body under the UNFCCC. 85 This decision was made as part
of the Bali Action Plan, which was adopted by the Conference of the
Parties to the UNFCCC. 6 This plan constitutes one track of the Bali
Roadmap. 7 The other track deals with the negotiations under the Kyoto
Protocol, which will be covered in the next subsection. The Bali Action
Plan was adopted by consensus after negotiating twenty-four hours over-
time.88 Tensions were high when the delegate from Papua New Guinea
asked the U.S. delegation to "get out of the way" if it was not going to
lead the way. 9 In the eleventh hour the U.S. delegation decided to be
more flexible and joined the consensus which allowed for the adoption of
the Bali Action Plan.
90
The Bali Action Plan sets out a roadmap that includes four building
blocks: mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer, and financial re-
sources. 91 AWGLCA is to carry out a comprehensive process to enable
the implementation of the UNFCCC through long-term action, starting
now and going beyond 2012.92 It is to produce an agreement that can be
adopted at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP-15) in
2009 in Copenhagen.93
AWGLCA has a mandate to come up with a long-term global goal
for emission reductions. 94 This has been lacking since the adoption of
the UNFCCC. There were no specific numbers defining what consti-
tuted "dangerous ... interference with the climate system."95 Now the
IPCC has stipulated that global emissions need to peak in 10-15 years
and that emissions need to decline by 50 percent by 2050 in the most
84. UNFCCC, Dialogue on Long-term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change by
Enhancing Implementation of the Convention, 1 1, Decision -/CP. 11 (Dec. 10, 2005) available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_ I /application/pdf/cop 1 _00_dialogueonlong-
term coop_action.pdf.
85. Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, 2.
86. Id.
87. Bali Roadmap, Address to Closing Plenary by His Excellency Mr. Rachmat Witoelar,
President, UN Climate Change Conference Closing of Joint High-Level Segment Bali (Dec. 15,
2007) available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop 13/application/pdf/closestatcopl 3_
president.pdf.
88. Summary of the Thirteenth Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change and Third Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: 3-15 December 2007, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (International Institute for Sustainable Development, New York, N.Y), Dec.
18, 2007, at 15, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12354e.pdf [hereinafter ENB].
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 20.
91. Id. at 19; see also Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, art. l(b)-(e).
92. Bali Action Plan, supra note 7, art. 1.
93. Id.
94. Id. art. 1(a).
95. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
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stringent stabilization category (below 490 ppmv C0 2-equivalent).96
Furthermore, Annex I Parties would need to reduce their emissions sig-
nificantly by 2020 (10-40 percent).97 These numbers were not, however,
spelled out in the Bali Action Plan due to opposition from the U.S., Can-
ada, Russia, and Japan, which did not want to prejudge the outcome of
the process. 98 The Plan makes a reference to the Fourth Assessment Re-
port of the IPCC, but only mentions "deep cuts" in global emissions will
be needed to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention.99
In regards to mitigation, AWGLCA is to consider mitigation com-
mitments or actions, including quantified emission limitations and reduc-
tion objectives by all developed country Parties. 00 Developing countries
are to have nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of
sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financ-
ing, and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable, and verifiable
manner.'01 Policy approaches related to reducing emissions from defor-
estation and forest degradation are also supposed to be considered.10 2 In
regards to mitigation, AWGLCA is also to consider cooperative sectoral
approaches and the use of markets.'
03
The Bali Action Plan calls for international cooperation to support
urgent implementation of adaptation action using vulnerability assess-
ments, financial-needs assessments, and capacity-building and response
strategies, among others. 0 4 Risk management is promoted as well as
insurance to transfer risks. 0 5 Furthermore, economic diversification is
emphasized to build resilience. 10 6  In regards to technology transfer,
AWGLCA is to consider means for removal of obstacles and provisions
of incentives to scale-up the development and transfer of technology to
developing countries, thus promoting access to affordable, environmen-
tally-sound technology. 0 7 Enhanced action on the provision of financial
resources will be based on consideration of improved access to adequate,
predictable and sustainable financial resources for developing countries,
96. BRIAN FISHER & NEBOJSA NAKICENOVIC, ISSUES RELATED TO MITIGATION IN THE LONG-
TERM CONTEXT 172, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-
chapter3.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
97. TERRY BARKER ET AL., CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, TECHNICAL
SUMMARY 90 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-
ts.pdf.
98. ENB, supra note 88, at 15.
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including new and additional resources and mobilization of private sector
funding and investment.'
0 8
B. Negotiations Under the Kyoto Protocol
In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, the first Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP-1) met in Montreal
in 2005 and began negotiations on longer-term international cooperation
on climate change. 109 They established a new subsidiary body, the Ad
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG).I"0 According to Article 3, paragraph 9 of the
Kyoto Protocol, commitments for subsequent periods-in other words
after 2012 (after the first commitment period)-shall be established for
Annex I Parties in amendments to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.'
The negotiators at Bali considered the work of AWG to be the second
track of the Bali Roadmap. At Bali, AWG agreed to spell out the target
ranges stipulated by the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, men-
tioned above," l 2 which AWGLCA was not able to agree on."l 3 This was
to show that AWG's work would be guided by a "shared vision" of the
UNFCCC's ultimate objective."14 One of the main tasks of AWG was to
develop a work program and timetable to guide the completion of its
work in order to avoid a gap between the first and second commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol." 5 AWG was able to reach this goal, set-
ting the deadline for 2009 when it will forward relevant decisions on
Annex I future commitments for adoption by COP/MOP-5 in Copenha-
gen. 
6
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL
The Bali Roadmap does not specify what form of an agreement is
supposed to be adopted in Copenhagen in 2009. Will there be a new
framework convention with new goals on global emission reductions-
long-term and short-term? There have been discussions that have con-
sidered setting commitments based on per capita emissions rather than
108. Id. art.l(e)(i), (v).
109. Press Release, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Dec. 10,
2005) available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/news-room/press-releases-and advisories/
application/pdf/press051210_cop 11 .pdf.
110. Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto
Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocoVitems/3878.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
Ill. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(9).
112. See lPCC's AR4, supra note 7.
113. REPORT OF THE AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON THE FURTHER COMMITMENTS FOR ANNEX
I PARTIES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ON ITS RESUMED FOURTH SESSION 5 (2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/awg4/eng/05.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) [hereinafter AWG
REPORT].
114. Id.; see also ENB, supra note 88, at 17-18.
115. AWG REPORT, supra note 113, at 5.
116. 1d. at 8.
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total emissions, and emission ranges have also been suggested." 7 Fur-
thermore, emissions by sectors such as transportation and utilities have
been considered.
18
The goal of the international community must be to move much
more quickly to act on climate change, especially now that we know that
we do not have decades to figure out what to do. 19 This article proposes
amending the UNFCCC to include "Annex III" to include the fast-
growing developing countries that emit large amounts of GHGs. 120 The
Annex III Parties would then have commitments under the Kyoto Proto-
col under a new "Annex C." Furthermore, a separate provision, Article
11-Bis, would be added to the Kyoto Protocol, entitled the "Annex C
Mitigation Fund." This fund would specifically assist the fast-growing
developing countries in achieving compliance with their new Kyoto Pro-
tocol commitments to be specified in Annex C.
Amending the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol by adding Annex
III, Annex C, and the Annex C Mitigation Fund would create the needed
equitable bargain between developed and developing countries. This
bargain would balance the primary interests of developing countries,
such as economic development to eradicate poverty and address debt
issues, with the primary interest of the developed countries to protect the
climate system. Furthermore, it would operationalize the concept of sus-
tainable development, which the international community agreed to im-
plement through the Rio Declaration, 12 and Agenda 21, adopted at the
Rio Conference in 1992.122 Amending the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol by adding Annex III, Annex C, and the Annex C Mitigation Fund
would reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
enunciated in the Rio Declaration. Ultimately, this proposal would pro-
mote sustainable development while upholding the stated objective of the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change: "stabilizing GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
', 2 3
117. See generally Kevin A. Baumert, Timothy Herzog & Jonathan Pershing, Navigating the
Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy (2005),
http://pdfwri.org/navigatingnumbersfront.pdf.
118. Id.
119. See Press Release, United Nations Foundation, Science Panel Outlines Roadmap for
Reducing Risks from Climate Change, (Feb. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.unfoundation.org/media center/press/2007/pr22707.asp.
120. RAJAMANI, supra note 54, at 248.
121. Rio Declaration, supra note 51, art. 1.
122. Agenda 21, available at http://habitat.igc.org/agenda21/index.html [hereinafter Agenda
21]. Sustainable development is commonly defined as development "meeting the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." OUR
COMMON FUTURE, supra note 36, at 8.
123. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2. Article 2 states that the objective is
to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of
the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
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The UNFCCC and the Berlin Mandate both state that Annex I Par-
ties should "take the lead., 124 This can be interpreted as implying that
developed countries are to take a leadership role based on the CBDR
principle. However, the ordinary meaning of "to take the lead" also im-
plies that once the Annex I Parties (developed countries) have taken the
first step, namely to fulfill their commitments in the first commitment
period, then non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) are to "follow"
with their own binding commitments, be they reduction commitments or
limitations or other types of action. 25 This interpretation is drawn from
the context of the UNFCCC's object and purpose of "stabilizing GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.' ' a6 Not taking dras-
tic action now to stabilize the GHGs will lead to dangerous interference
with the climate system.
Assuming Annex B Parties actually take the lead by fulfilling their
obligations during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol,
developing countries (at least those emitting large amounts of GHGs)
then need to follow with commitments of their own during either the
second or third commitment period. It is becoming quite clear that, in
terms of development, some developing countries, such as China and
India, are growing much more rapidly than they were at the time the
Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997. Consequently, they are emitting
much greater amounts of GHGs than many developed countries. This
new situation must be reflected in the Kyoto Protocol's commitments.
27
Given the scientific indications that climate change needs to be addressed
urgently, all Parties that are major emitters of GHGs (both Annex I Par-
ties and countries like China and India) must have binding commitments.
Otherwise the object and purpose of the Climate Convention would be
defeated: The international community would not be able to stabilize
GHGs at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system.
If the major GHG-emitting developing countries are not given bind-
ing reduction commitments, the CBDR principle will have been taken
beyond the limits of the object and purpose of the Climate Convention.
However, it is important to stress that the assumption of binding com-
mitments by major GHG-emitting developing countries is still contingent
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic devel-
opment to proceed in a sustainable manner.
Id.
124. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(2)(a); see also Berlin Mandate, supra note 82, §
I(1)(a).
125. Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31.
126. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
127. At the COP-12 in November 2006, there was also mention that there be "wider and deep-
ening participation" in regards to GHG reduction commitments. See ENB, supra note 88, at 11.
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on the actions of the developed countries. The developed countries still
need to "take the lead" by reducing their emissions during the first com-
mitment period as dictated in Annex B and by committing to more strin-
gent reduction targets for the second commitment period. On the issue
of emission reduction ranges, Yvo de Boer stated in Bali that "[w]hat's
becoming clear to me is the more robust industrialized countries are will-
ing to be in terms of the effort they are working towards, the stronger the
reaction you're likely to get from developing countries."' 2 8  "If these
commitments were watered down," he said, "G77 countries would be
justified in asking why they should be more ambitious."'
' 29
A. Annex C
Using the Montreal Protocol as a model, the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol should amend the UNFCCC to create Annex III, a new category
of Parties which would then have binding commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol stipulated in Annex C. Annex III would include non-Annex I
Parties with high levels of GHG emissions, such as China, India, and
Brazil. Annex III Parties would have binding limitation, reduction, or
mitigation action commitments under Annex C in the Kyoto Protocol
starting in the second (2013-2017) or third commitment period (2018-
2022), with a five-year delayed compliance schedule.
130
Technically, Annex III Parties would have many of the same rights
as Annex I Parties in the context of the Kyoto Protocol, yet in the context
of the UNFCCC they would remain non-Annex I Parties.' 31 Further-
more, Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, containing the core commitment,
would be amended to include Annex III as follows: "The Parties in-
cluded in Annex I and Annex III shall ... ensure that their ... emissions
... do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments or mitigation
action commitments inscribed in Annex B [and Annex C].' 32 As they
grow and emit greater amounts of GHGs, additional developing countries
would graduate into the Annex III category.' 33 China and India would
qualify right away to be included in Annex III, with commitments under
128. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Previous Coverage from
COP 13, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_ 13/items/4231 .php (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
129. Id.
130. This is assuming the commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol are not extended beyond
five years, but continue the pattern of the first commitment period.
131. Kevin A. Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate
Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 365, 390-91 (2006). Bau-
mert explains this type of status in the context of parties taking on voluntary commitments through
the use of the alternative process available in Climate Convention Article 4.2(g) for becoming an
Annex I Party. Id. Yet, that status would be analogous to the status described here for Annex III
Parties.
132. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3(1).
133. See Tadashi Otsuka, Professor, Waseda Univ., Tokyo, Japan, Presentation at the Interna-
tional Symposium: Legal Principles and Post-2012 Climate Regime (Dec. 17, 2006) (slides from
presentation on file with author).
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Annex C in the Kyoto Protocol. For some developing countries included
in Annex III, there would only be obligations to take actions or measures
to mitigate climate change, others would have a limitation on emission of
GHGs and not a reduction requirement. Within Annex C, the amount of
reductions or limitations would be differentiated, just as they are in An-
nex B among the developed countries.
An important question for further analysis is when the CBDR prin-
ciple ceases to apply because the former developing country has reached
a certain level of economic growth and is no longer different from devel-
oped countries. In regards to emissions, would the state then graduate
from Annex C into the Annex B category, joining the other developed
Parties? One would have to take into account the capacity of fast-
growing countries to take on the same binding commitments as long-time
developed countries. Furthermore, one would need to determine at what
level of development China and India should leave the developing coun-
try classification and enter the ranks of developed countries.
B. Annex C Mitigation Fund
To complement Annex C, a new Annex C Mitigation Fund needs to
be incorporated into the Kyoto Protocol as "Article 1 1-Bis," placed im-
mediately after Article 11, the financial provision. This amendment
would be adopted simultaneously with the amendments to include Annex
III in the UNFCCC and Annex C in the Protocol in order to promote the
early participation of Annex III Parties in fulfilling their new Annex C
commitments. This new arrangement would depend on the political will
of the developed countries, since to a large extent they would be funding
the Annex C Mitigation Fund. This fund would have to be substantial to
help the Annex III Parties receive technology transfers and other assis-
tance much faster than provided by the current financial mechanism un-
der the Climate Convention and the Kyoto Protocol that is operated by
the Global Environment Facility. 13 4 The financing for the Annex C Miti-
gation Fund would come from a specific small fee charged in emission
trading transactions. As a result, the funding would come from devel-
oped countries because Annex B Parties are currently the only Parties
using the emissions trading mechanism. As Annex III Parties start to use
the emissions trading mechanism, they would also participate in the
funding of the Annex C Mitigation Fund.
Following the trend in the U.N. to partner with the private sector,
the Annex C Mitigation Fund would not necessarily be run by the Global
Environment Facility, but could be managed by an international private
bank accountable to and guided by the COP/MOP. The goal would be to
use the more efficient private banking system to track, manage, and dis-
perse the funds earmarked for the financing of the incremental costs of
134. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 11, 21(3); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 11.
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"clean" technology transfer and other assistance to Annex C countries.
The chosen bank would already have adopted the Equator Principles.1
35
One could argue that fast-growing developing countries emitting
large amounts of GHGs would be more likely to take on voluntary com-
mitments than agree to binding commitments under Annex C. However,
setting up a system in which developing countries with major economies
are in a separate category seems more advantageous than subjecting them
to the binding commitments under Annex B. 136 Furthermore, the Annex
Ill/Annex C system includes the five-year delayed compliance schedule
and the Annex C Mitigation Fund set up specifically for developing
countries. The purpose of an Annex C Mitigation Fund is to facilitate the
assumption of binding commitments by developing countries emitting
large amounts of GHGs without having to slow down their economic
growth in any drastic way, thereby promoting sustainable development.
C. Climate Change Corps
In order to make the Annex C Mitigation Fund more effective, a
new set of capacity-building teams, an equivalent of the "Peace
Corps"-the Climate Change Corps (3Cs)-should also be introduced.
This special corps of volunteer engineers and climate scientists, among
others, would be set up by individual Annex I nations. The 3Cs would
be funded by the Annex C Mitigation Fund and coordinated by UNDP in
order to make sure these capacity-building teams were sent to the fast-
growing developing countries that needed them most urgently. The 3Cs
would help facilitate the developing countries' move toward low-carbon
sustainable development, by assisting with mitigating climate change at
all levels, such as training in the area of fundamental research on climate
change, assisting with GHG emissions monitoring systems, improving
the ability to adapt to and assimilate transferred technologies, and facili-
tating in the invention and production of endogenous "clean" technology.
D. Kyoto Mechanisms
Regarding the Kyoto Mechanisms, Annex C Parties would be able
to take advantage of all the flexible mechanisms. Currently, developing
countries can only participate in the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). Participating in all three mechanisms is important because be-
ing eligible to participate in emissions trading can help Annex III Parties
economically, while at the same time fulfilling their reduction commit-
135. The Equator Principles are guidelines for banks working in the project finance sector to
ensure that projects are socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices.
The Equator Principles (July 2006), available at http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/EquatorPrinciples.pdf.
136. Voluntary commitments could be adopted by first expressing to be bound by the Climate
Convention, Article 4(2)(g), and then taking on commitments under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4(2)(g); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, annex B.
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ments. For instance, when they use energy efficiency to cut back on
GHG emissions, they can sell the surplus credits and then use the reve-
nue to fund new cleaner energy technology, making more credits avail-
able for them. However, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol would have to
be amended to read as follows: "The Parties included in Annex B [and
Annex C] may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfill-
ing their commitments under Article 3. " l37 In the same manner, joint
implementation would give the large GHG emitting developing countries
the possibility of funding projects in the territory of other Annex I or
Annex III Parties and receiving credits toward their own commitments.
In terms of the CDM, Annex III Parties, such as India with 33.33
percent of the program's projects, 138 would likely want to carry on as
host countries to projects carried out under the CDM. Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol specifically states that the mechanism shall assist Parties
not included in Annex 1.139 In other words, Annex III Parties would con-
tinue to receive assistance in "achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention" as specified in
Article 12.140 To achieve this, the text of Article 12 should be amended
to read:
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development
and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and
to assist Parties included in Annex I [and Annex HI] in achieving
compliance with their quantified emission reduction limitation and
reduction commitments under Article 3.
Annex III Parties could continue to host CDM projects, helping them
achieve sustainable development. At the same time, these Annex III
Parties could also carry out CDM projects in other developing countries
and use the credits they receive to comply with their Annex C limitation
or reduction commitments. For CDM projects carried out by Annex B
Parties in the territory of Annex C Parties, the credits would go to the
Annex B Parties.
E. Amending the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
In order to incorporate Annex III into the UNFCCC and Annex C
and the Annex C Mitigation Fund into the Kyoto Protocol, the Protocol
would have to be amended by the Parties. To amend the Kyoto Protocol
137. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 17.
138. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CDM Statistics, Registration,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2008). There are 948 registered project activities as of March 3, 2008. Id.
139. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 12(2).
140. Id. This would allow developing countries to mature economically while taking social
and environmental issues, including climate change, into account. See OUR COMMON FUTURE,
supra note 36, at 8; Rio Declaration, supra note 51, princs. 3-5.
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in order to incorporate the Annex C Mitigation Fund as Article 11 -Bis
requires that a proposed amendment be sent to the Parties at least six
months before the COP/MOP where it would be proposed for adop-
tion. 141 If the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol could not reach agreement by
consensus, the amendment would be adopted by a three-fourths majority
vote of the Parties. 142 The amendment would enter into force for the
Parties that accepted it ninety days after at least three-fourths of the Par-
ties deposited their instrument of ratification. 143 Adopting a new Annex
III to the UNFCCC and Annex C to the Kyoto Protocol would follow the
same procedure as for an amendment to the treaty and Protocol.'
44
CONCLUSION
The best result that can be hoped for to result from the COP- 15 in
Copenhagen in 2009 is to amend the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol to
get near universal participation in a more forceful way to address the
enormous challenges of climate change, so every nation feels its con-
cerns are addressed. The UNFCCC should be amended to include a new
category of Parties-Annex III Parties--defined as emerging economies
(the fast-growing developing countries). These Parties will be able to
commit to mitigation measures/emission cuts under a new Annex C of
the Kyoto Protocol in return for financial and technological assistance
provided by a new Annex C Mitigation Fund. Then, perhaps, the United
States will feel compelled to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and comply with
its stipulated reduction targets under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol,
allowing for a unified approach against global climate change. This
would go a long way in addressing the dilemmas of climate regulation
and equity. It would also allow the fast-growing developing countries to
move toward sustainable development, while at the same time address
the scourge of climate change based on the efforts made by the devel-
oped countries to assist them financially and using effective mechanisms
to provide them with affordable, environmentally-sound technologies.
141. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 20(3).
142. Id. art. 20(4).
143. Id. art. 20(5).
144. Id. art. 21(3)-(4); see also UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 15-16.
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